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1Routes to failure: analysis of 41 civil aviation accidents from the 
Republic of China using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System
Abstract
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is based 
upon Reason’s organizational model of human error.  HFACS was 
developed as an analytical framework for the investigation of the role 
of human error in aviation accidents, however, there is little 
empirical work formally describing the relationship between the 
components in the model.  This research analyses 41 civil aviation 
accidents occurring to aircraft registered in the Republic of China 
(ROC) between 1999 and 2006 using the HFACS framework.  The results 
show statistically significant relationships between errors at the 
operational level and organizational inadequacies at both the 
immediately adjacent level (preconditions for unsafe acts) and higher 
levels in the organization (unsafe supervision and organizational 
influences).  The pattern of the ‘routes to failure’ observed in the 
data from this analysis of civil aircraft accidents show great 
similarities to that observed in the analysis of military accidents.  
This research lends further support to Reason’s model that suggests 
that active failures are promoted by latent conditions in the 
organization.  Statistical relationships linking fallible decisions in 
upper management levels were found to directly affect supervisory 
practices, thereby creating the psychological preconditions for unsafe 
acts and hence indirectly impairing the performance of pilots, 
ultimately leading to accidents.  
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31 INTRODUCTION 
When investigating the causes of aviation accidents, the human factors 
focus has now shifted away from investigating skill deficiencies and 
has moved toward other factors such as decision-making, attitudes, 
supervisory factors and organizational culture (Diehl, 1989; Jensen, 
1997).  This change in emphasis has resulted in human error frameworks 
and accident investigation schemes being developed that investigate 
and categorise the organizational factors and psychological precursors 
surrounding the accident in an attempt to develop a more complete 
understanding of the circumstances and hence aid in the development of 
effective prevention strategies.  
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS (Shappell 
and Weigmann, 2001, 2003, 2004; Weigmann and Shappell, 1997, 2001a, 
2001b, 2001c, 2003) is perhaps the most widely used human factors 
accident analysis framework.  HFACS was developed from Reason’s 
organizationally based model of human error (Reason, 1990, 1997).  In 
this model active failures (errors) of front-line operators (in this 
case pilots) combine with latent failures lying dormant in the system 
to breach its defences.  These latent failures are spawned in the 
upper levels of the organization and are related to management and 
regulatory structures.  
HFACS addresses human errors and the factors underpinning them at four 
levels.  The framework is described diagrammatically in figure 1.  
Level 1 (unsafe acts of operators - active failures) is the level at 
which the majority of accident investigations have been focused in the 
past.  These are the behaviours of the flight crew on the flight deck 
that contribute directly to the accident.  Failures at this level can 
4be further classified into two sub-categories; errors and violations.  
Errors fall into three basic error types (skill-based, decision, and 
perceptual).  Violations, however, are instances of the willful 
disregard of rules, which subsequently result in an accident. Level 2
(preconditions for unsafe acts - latent/active failures) addresses the 
psychological pre-cursors to the active failures at level 1, such as 
the substandard conditions of the operators and the operating 
environment which predispose them to making an error.  Level 3 (unsafe 
supervision - latent failures) traces the causal chain of events 
producing the unsafe acts up to the level of the front-line 
supervisors.  Level 4 (organizational influences - latent failures)
describes the contributions of fallible decisions in upper levels of 
management that directly affect supervisory practices, as well as the 
conditions and actions of front-line operators.  Each higher level 
affects the next downward level in HFACS framework.  Reinach and Viale 
(2006) argue that the use of a classification system to investigate 
incidents and accidents has several benefits compared to a less 
structured, more ad hoc process.  It provides a consistent and format 
for accident/incident data collection and analysis; it ensure the 
accident and incident investigations are undertaken systematically and 
comprehensively; it helps counteract investigator’s heuristics and 
biases and it allows the comparisons of contributing factors across 
industries. 
Wiegmann & Shappell (2001b) claim that the HFACS framework bridges the 
gap between theory and practice by providing safety professionals with 
a theoretically based tool for identifying and classifying the human 
errors in aviation mishaps.  Given that the system focuses on both 
latent and active failures and their inter-relationships, it 
facilitates the identification of the underlying causes of human 
5error.  HFACS was originally designed and developed as a human error 
framework for investigating and analysing human error accidents in US 
military aviation operations (Shappell and Weigmann, 2001) however the 
framework’s developers have also demonstrated its applicability to the 
analysis of accidents in US commercial aviation (Shappell and 
Weigmann, 2001; Weigmann and Shappell, 2001a, 2001c) and US general 
aviation (Shappell and Weigmann, 2003).  The system has also been used 
to analyse the underlying human factors causes in accidents involving 
remotely-piloted aircraft (Tvarnyas, Thompson and Constable, 2006); 
air traffic control incidents (Scarborough and Pounds, 2001) and has 
been further developed to investigate both maintenance error in 
aircraft (Krulak, 2004) and for the investigation of railroad 
accidents (Reinach and Viale, 2006).
Although the HFACS framework has received wide acceptance as a tool 
for investigating and analysing aircraft accidents there have been 
some criticisms of it.  Beaubien and Baker (2002) noted that it was 
often difficult to collect information about the latent conditions 
from incident or accident reports.  Furthermore, they added that all 
the evidence collected relating to its reliability and validity had 
been collected and analyzed by the developers of the framework.  
However, other authors have now successfully used and proven the 
system outside the US, for example in India and the Republic of China 
(Gaur, 2005; Li and Harris, 2005a).  These studies have also shown the 
framework to have a high degree of inter-rater reliability when coding 
accident narratives.  Dekker (2001) suggested that the HFACS framework 
has only a slight link between human error and working environment and 
there is some confusion between categorization and analysis.  The 
simple assignment of errors to categories has no explanatory power and 
suggests neither what contributes to these errors being made nor 
6remedial actions to avoid them in the future.  He added that the 
framework merely repositioned human errors by shifting them from the 
forefront to higher up in the organization instead of finding 
solutions for them.  Although HFACS was based directly on the 
organizational theory of failure espoused by Reason (1990; 1997) at 
the time it was derived there was little or no quantitative data to 
support the theoretical model upon which it was based.  However 
recently several studies have uncovered statistical relationships 
describing the cause/effect relationships between various components 
at the different levels in the analysis and classification system, 
giving support to the underpinning theory behind the framework (Li & 
Harris 2006a; Li & Harris, 2006b; Tvaryanas, Thompson & Constable, 
2006).  These analyses begin to describe statistically how actions and 
decisions at higher managerial levels promulgate down through the 
organization to result in operational errors and accidents.  
However, it needs to be noted that the studies by Li & Harris (2006a, 
2006b) and Tvaryanas, Thompson & Constable (2006) were undertaken in 
the context of military flight operations and the operation of 
uninhabited air vehicles and only in the case of the Li and Harris 
papers, did the analyses progress to the highest organizational levels.  
Li and Harris (2006a) clearly showed that deficiencies in 
Organizational Processes and Organizational Climate (HFACS level 4) 
increased the likelihood of deficiencies in Inadequate Supervision 
(HFACS level 3) thirteen-fold.  The category of ‘inadequate 
supervision’ had a particularly strong association with the level 2 
category of ‘crew resource management’ (CRM). It was suggested that 
failures of senior officers in supervisory positions to provide 
guidance and operational doctrine to pilots by promoting good CRM 
practices was indirectly associated with active, operational failures.  
7Again, the odds ratios suggested failures as a result of poor CRM were 
almost 13 times more likely to occur in the presence of a concomitant 
failure in the category of ‘supervisory failure.’  Finally, Li and 
Harris (2006a) observed that several latent pre-conditions for unsafe 
acts (at HFACS level 2) showed strong associations with active 
failures at level 1.  These level 2 factors exhibited Reason’s classic 
‘many to one’ mapping of psychological precursors to active failures 
in several of the level 1 categories. 
__________________________
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
__________________________
As stated in the previous paragraph, this research applied the HFACS 
framework to analyse Republic of China (ROC) Air Force accidents.  The 
objective was to provide probabilities for the co-occurrence of 
categories across adjacent levels of the HFACS to establish how 
factors in the upper (organizational) levels in the framework affect 
categories in lower (operational) levels.  It was suggested that once 
the significant paths were identified the development of intervention 
strategies should proceed more rapidly and effectively.  Civil 
airlines have very quite different organizational imperatives and 
organizational structure.  Harris and Morley (2006) argue that 
military aviation is a much less open system than is commercial civil 
aviation (see Katz and Kahn, 1978).  The armed forces exert far more 
control over flight operations and, at least in peacetime, the 
operating environment.  Air Forces are responsible for much of the 
maintenance of the aircraft they fly; they operate their own airfields 
and provide their own Air Traffic Control services; they train their 
own pilots and engineers and all personnel are indoctrinated into the 
8military culture and way of working.  In contrast, civil airlines 
operate into a wide range of airports (none of which they own); 
aircraft maintenance is often provided by third parties; aircraft ramp 
servicing is almost invariably provided by a range of external 
suppliers and ATC is provided by the air traffic services providers 
from the countries into which they either operate or overfly.  From an 
organizational perspective, airlines can be considered to be 
considerably more ‘open’ than military aviation.  As a result, it 
needs to be established if the same routes to failure exist in the 
operation of commercial aircraft.   
This study examines 41 accidents occurring to civil aircraft in the 
ROC using the HFACS framework.  Using data from ROC civil aviation 
accidents allows a direct comparison (without any cultural confounding 
effects) of the organizational routes to failure with the earlier work 
undertaken with the air force of the same country.  
2 METHOD
2.1 Data 
The aviation accident reports were obtained from ROC Aviation Safety 
Council between 1999 and 2006.  A total of 41 accidents and reportable 
incidents occurred within this time period.  All accidents and serious 
incidents conformed to the definition within the 9th edition of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 13 (International 
Civil Aviation Organisation, 2006). There were 24 different types of 
aircraft involved in the accidents analysed, including commercial jets 
airliners (Airbus A300, A320 and A330; Boeing B737 and B747; 
9McDonnell-Douglas MD11, MD82, MD83 and MD90): private jets (Bombardier 
BD700): turbo-prop powered aircraft (ATR 72-200; De Havilland Canada 
DASH-8-300, Fokker 50) and commercial helicopters (Bell UH-1H, 206 and 
430; Boeing 234; Eurocopter BK117).  Full copies of all these accident 
reports may be found on the ROC Aviation Council web site 
(http://www.asc.gov.tw/asc_en/accident_list_1.asp). 
2.2 Classification framework
The version of the HFACS framework described in Wiegmann and Shappell 
(2003) was utilised in this study (see figure 1).  Level 1 of the 
HFACS categorises events under the headings of ‘unsafe acts of 
operators’ that can lead to an accident.  This comprises four sub-
categories of ‘decision errors’; ‘skill-based errors’; ‘perceptual 
errors’ and ‘violations’.  Level 2 of HFACS is concerned with 
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’.  This has seven sub-categories within 
it: ‘adverse mental states’; ‘adverse physiological states’; 
‘physical/mental limitations’; ‘crew resource management’; ‘personal 
readiness’; ‘physical environment’, and ‘technological environment’.  
Level 3 of HFACS is concerned with ‘unsafe supervision’ which includes 
the four categories: ‘inadequate supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate 
operation’; ‘failure to correct known problem’, and ‘supervisory 
violation’.  Level 4, the highest level in the framework is labelled 
‘organizational influences’ and comprises of three sub-categories: 
‘resource management’; ‘organizational climate’ and ‘organizational 
process’.  
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2.3 Coding process
Two aviation human factors specialists coded each accident report 
independently.  The analysts had previously been trained together on 
the use of the analysis and categorization framework to ensure that 
they achieved a detailed and accurate understanding of it.  This 
training consisted of three half-day modules delivered by an aviation 
psychologist.  The training syllabus included an introduction to the 
HFACS framework; explanation of the definitions of the four different 
levels of HFACS; and a further detailed description of the content of 
the eighteen individual HFACS categories.  Subsequent to this the 
raters then jointly analysed two years of the ROC air force accident 
data to develop a shared understanding of the categorization process 
and achieve a common understanding of the categories.  Prior to 
undertaking the present study these analysts also undertook the 
analysis of 523 ROC air force accidents reported elsewhere (Li and 
Harris, 2006a, 2006b). 
The presence or the absence of each HFACS category was evaluated from 
the narrative of each accident report.  Each HFACS category was 
counted a maximum of only once per accident, thus this count acted 
simply as an indicator of the presence or absence of each of the 18 
categories within a given accident.  
Where there were discrepancies in the categorisation of an accident, 
the raters convened and resolved their observations.  
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3 RESULTS
3.1 Inter-rater reliability
Prior to resolution of discrepancies in coding between the raters, the 
inter-rater reliabilities, calculated on a category-by-category, basis 
were assessed using Cohen’s Kappa.  In half the categories the Kappa 
values was in excess of 0.40, which is regarded as being acceptable 
(Landis and Koch, 1977).  For the remainder of the categories, though, 
the Kappa value failed to achieve this level.  Values for Kappa range 
between 0 and 1.00, where 0 represents complete independence between 
raters and 1.00 is indicative of perfect agreement (Cohen, 1960).
Below 0.40 is regarded as a poor level of inter-rater reliability.  
However, Cohen’s Kappa has several weaknesses as an index of inter-
rater reliability.  Low observed frequencies can distort Kappa values, 
deflating its value where there is actually a very high level of 
agreement.  Cohen’s Kappa becomes unreliable when the vast majority of 
observations fall into just one of the categories and there is also a
high percentage of agreement between raters in this category (as in 
the category ‘adverse physiological states’ – see table 1).  In such a 
case Cohen’s Kappa will be low as the statistic is based upon expected 
probabilities calculated from the marginal observed totals 
(Huddlestone, 2003).  Gwet (2002a, 2002b) also observed that Kappa 
does not take in account raters’ sensitivity and specificity.  Gwet 
also observed that Kappa becomes unreliable when raters’ agreement is 
either very small or very high.  As a result, inter-rater 
reliabilities were also calculated as a simple percentage rate of 
agreement.  These showed reliability figures of between 63.4% and 
95.1%, indicating acceptable reliability between the raters.  
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3.2 Overview of analysis rationale
The data were cross-tabulated to describe the strength of association 
between the categories at adjacent levels in the HFACS framework.  
Chi-square (2) analyses were performed to estimate the statistical 
strength of association between the categories in the higher and lower 
levels of the framework.  However, as the 2 test is a simple test of 
association these analyses were supplemented with further analyses 
using Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda (λ) which was used to calculate the 
proportional reduction in error (PRE).  The lambda statistic is a 
measure (ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 represents certainty) of the 
extent that knowledge of the category of one variable improves the 
prediction of the other variable.  Lambda (Goodman and Kruskal, 1954) 
has the advantage of being a directional statistic.  The lower level 
categories in the HFACS were designated as being dependent upon the 
categories at the immediately higher level in the framework, which is 
congruent with the framework’s underlying theoretical assumptions.  
From a theoretical standpoint, lower levels in the HFACS cannot 
adversely affect higher levels.  Higher levels in the HFACS are deemed 
to influence (cause) changes at the lower organizational levels, thus 
going beyond what may be deemed a simple test of co-occurrence between 
categories.  Finally, odds ratios were also calculated to provide an 
estimate of the likelihood of the presence of a contributory factor in 
one HFACS category being associated with the concomitant presence of a 
factor in another category.  However, it must be noted that odds 
ratios are an asymmetric measure and so are only really theoretically 
meaningful when associated with a non-zero value for lambda.  
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3.3 Results
_________________________
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
_________________________
In total 330 instances of human error, describing the underlying 
causal factors of the 41 accidents, were recorded using the HFACS 
framework.  
Initial results found that there were 107 instances of acts (32.4% of 
all errors recorded) at the level of ‘unsafe acts of operators’ (level 
1).  Errors at this level were implicated in 85.4% (35) of accidents.  
There were 84 (25.4%) instances of errors at the level of 
‘Preconditions for unsafe acts’ level (level 2).  Errors recorded at 
this level were implicated in 82.9 % (34) of all the accidents 
analysed.  At the level of ‘unsafe supervision’ (level 3), there were 
82 (24.8%) instances of error that were implicated in 75.6% (31) of 
accidents.  Finally, at the ‘organizational influences’ level in the 
HFACS model (level 4) there were 57 (17.3 %) instances of error 
recorded, implicated in 68.3% (28) of accidents in the sample (see 
table 1).
To keep the overall type I error rate across the whole analysis to 
p<0.05, using a Bonferroni adjustment (Sankoh, Huque and Dubey, 1997) 
the individual alpha level for each analysis was set to p<0.001.  
Using this value, 16 relationships between categories at adjacent 
HFACS levels showed significant associations (see table 2). 
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________________________
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
_________________________
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS 
level-4 ‘organizational influences’ and HFACS level-3 ‘unsafe 
supervision’ indicated that of a possible 12 relationships, six pairs 
of associations were significant (p<0.001) between categories at 
adjacent levels.  ‘Organizational process’ was significantly 
associated with all four supervisory factors at level-3:  ‘inadequate 
supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate operations’; ‘failed to correct a 
known problem’; and ‘supervisory violations’.  Resource management was 
significantly associated with two categories at level-3, ‘inadequate 
supervision’ and ‘planned inappropriate operations’.  These 
statistically significant relationships are summarized in table 2 and 
are described diagrammatically in figure 2.  Organizational climate 
had no significant associations with any level-3 categories. 
__________________________
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
__________________________
It will be noted from table 2 that in several of the tests of 
association performed between categories at HFACS level-4 and 3 very 
high odds ratios are observed, all of which are associated with non-
zero values for lambda.  Inadequate supervision is over ten times more 
likely to occur when there are organizational level issues associated 
with poor resource management.  Similarly, inadequate supervision is 
nine-times more likely to occur in the presence of poor organizational 
15
processes, an issue also associated with inflating the likelihood of 
failing to correct known problems by a similar amount.
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS 
level-3 ‘unsafe supervision’ and level-2 ‘pre-conditions for unsafe 
acts’ shows just three pairs of associations to be significant 
(p<0.001) between categories at these adjacent levels.  These were 
‘inadequate supervision’ at level-3 versus ‘CRM’ at level-2; ‘planned 
inappropriate operations’ at level three with the ‘physical 
environment’ at level-2 and ‘supervisory violation’ versus ‘personal 
readiness’.  Of these comparisons it can be seen that poor CRM was 
over eight times more likely to occur in the presence of ‘inadequate 
supervision’ at the higher organizational level. 
The analysis of the strength of association between categories at 
HFACS level-2 ‘pre-conditions for unsafe acts’ and level-1 ‘unsafe 
acts of operators’ shows seven pairs of associations to be significant 
between the categories at these two adjacent levels.  These mainly 
fall into two distinct groupings.  In the first group the level-2 
category ‘CRM’ was significantly associated with three categories of 
unsafe act: ‘decision errors’; ‘skill-based errors’ and ‘violations’.  
In the second grouping ‘adverse mental states’ was also significantly 
associated with three categories of unsafe act:  ‘decision errors’; 
‘skill-based errors’ and ‘perceptual errors’.  The final relationship 
was between the HFACS level-2 category of the ‘physical environment’ 
and the level-1 category of ‘perceptual error’.  
Of particular note are the downward relationships the category of poor 
CRM has with the three level-1 categories.  Inspection of the 
associated odds ratios show between (approximately) a 30-40 fold 
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increase in the likelihood of error or violation in the presence of 
poor CRM practices.   
4 DISCUSSION
It can be seen from the data presented in table 1 that the majority of 
HFACS categories had large enough numbers of instances of occurrence 
in the data set to allow reasonable confidence in the pattern of 
results obtained.  All categories also exhibited good levels of inter-
rater reliability ranging from 63.4% for the HFACS level-4 category of 
‘resource management’ to 95.1% for the level-2 category of ‘adverse 
physiological states’.  These were as good as, or in excess of the 
levels reported in previous studies (e.g. Gaur, 2005; Li and Harris, 
2005a; Weigmann and Shappell, 1997). 
Reason (1990, 1997) proposed that latent conditions promoting unsafe 
acts are inevitably present in all systems.  The original decision on 
how to allocate resources made at the highest levels in the 
organization may originally have been based on sound commercial 
arguments but such inequities can create reliability or safety 
problems in other, operational parts of the system.  The analyses in 
this paper clearly show that inadequacies at HFACS level-4 
(‘organizational influences’) had associations with further 
inadequacies at HFACS level-3 (‘unsafe supervision).  See table 2 and 
figure 2.  The category of ‘organizational process’ is a particularly 
important factor at this highest organizational level.  Poor 
‘organizational processes’ were associated with inadequacies in all 
categories at the level of ‘unsafe supervision’ and hence indirectly 
were ultimately at the root of many operational errors resulting in 
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accidents.  In the HFACS framework inadequacies in ‘organizational 
processes’ includes such issues as imposing excessive time pressures 
on staff; poor mission scheduling; poor incentivization; management 
failing to set clearly defined objectives; poor risk management 
programmes; inadequate management checks for safety; and failing to 
establish safety programmes.  ‘Resource management’ (which involved 
the selection, staffing and training of human resources at an 
organizational level; excessive cost cutting; providing unsuitable 
equipment, and a failure to remedy design flaws) also showed strong 
relationships with the two level-3 categories of ‘inadequate 
supervision’ and ‘planned inappropriate operations).  Both Reason 
(1990) and Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) hypothesized that 
inappropriate decision-making by upper-level management can adversely 
influence the personnel and practices at the supervisory level, which 
in turn affects the psychological pre-conditions and hence the 
subsequent actions of the front-line operators.  This study provides 
statistical support for this hypothesized relationship.  A similar 
pattern of results was also found in the analysis of 523 ROC air force 
accidents previously reported by Li and Harris (2006a, 2006b). 
The level-2 (‘preconditions for unsafe acts’) category of ‘CRM’ was 
perhaps the key factor in HFACS framework.  CRM encompasses issues 
such as a lack of teamwork on the flight deck; poor communication 
between flight crew; failures of leadership and inadequate crew 
briefings.  Inadequacies in CRM practices were particularly influenced 
by the level-3 category of ‘inadequate supervision’.  This category in 
the HFACS framework encompasses issues such as a failure to provide 
proper training or adequate rest periods; a lack of accountability; 
failure to track qualifications and performance of personnel; the use 
of untrained supervisors and a general loss of situation awareness at 
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the supervisory level).  The risk of ‘inadequate supervision’ was 
itself greatly inflated by poor organizational processes and resource 
management issues.  The earlier study of Li and Harris (2006a; 2006b) 
also observed that the issue of inadequate supervision was the key 
link between inadequacies at the higher organizational levels and poor 
CRM. 
Reason (1990) suggested that human behaviour is governed by the 
interplay between psychological and situational factors.  In 
particular two pre-conditions for unsafe acts (HFACS level-2 - ‘CRM’ 
and ‘adverse mental states’) showed a strong statistical relationship 
with the active failures of the operators at level-1 (see table 2 and 
figure 2).  This was also observed in the earlier study of ROC air 
force accidents.  Poor CRM is associated with ‘decision errors’ 
(instances in this category included, selecting inappropriate 
strategies to perform a mission; improper in-flight planning; making 
an inappropriate decision to abort a take-off or landing, or using 
improper remedial actions in an emergency) and ‘skill based errors’ 
(for example, inappropriate stick and rudder coordination; excessive 
use of flight controls; glideslope not being maintained, and adopting 
an improper airspeed or altitude).  However it is also noticeable that 
poor CRM practices are associated with the level-1 category of 
‘violations’, which encompasses issues such as intentionally ignoring 
standard operating procedures (SOPs); neglecting SOPs; applying 
improper SOPs; and diverting from SOPs.  Adverse mental states are 
those conditions that affect pilot performance, such as loss of 
situational awareness; task fixation; distraction and mental fatigue 
due to stress.  It is perhaps not too surprising that such mental 
states pre-dispose accident involved pilots to all the main categories 
of human error. 
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Reason (1990, 1997) has suggested that there is a ‘many to one’ 
mapping of the psychological precursors of unsafe acts and the actual 
errors themselves, making it difficult to predict which actual errors 
will occur as a result of which preconditions.  The results of this 
study using the HFACS framework support this assertion.  It is also 
evident that accidents rarely involved just a single error.  Overall 
every accident involved an average of over eight individual errors 
distributed across the various organizational levels and even across 
different organizations.  These erroneous actions need not be confined 
to either the flight deck or the airline.  For example, the report on 
the investigation of the runway incursion occurrence involving a 
TransAsia Airways aircraft (flight GE543) concluded that there was 
inadequate planning and implementation in airport construction safety 
procedures by both the Taiwanese Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and 
the Military Authorities (both problems in ‘organizational process’, 
HFACS level-4); there was an error in issuing an approval to land 
after the curfew time (‘decision error’, HFACS level-1) and 
insufficient cooperation and coordination between the CAA and the 
military base authorities prior to commencing construction work
(‘inadequate supervision’, HFACS level-3). There was also a lack of 
communication between ATC and workers on the ground (a coordination 
and personnel resource management [‘CRM’] issue, HFACS level-2) and 
finally there was the action of workers to enter the airfield without 
approval by ATC (‘violation’, HFACS level-1) (Aviation Safety Council, 
2004).
The errors finally resulting in an accident may also be separated by 
considerable periods of time.  To illustrate, in the China Airlines 
CI-611 accident, the principal causal factors could be tracked back to 
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a failure to follow the Structural Repair Manual for the repair of a
tail strike occurring to the aircraft 22 years prior to the accident.  
It was concluded that there was no work audit system and a failure to 
provide both flight safety inspection training and a handbook for 
inspectors (‘resource management’ and ‘organizational process’ issues,
HFACS level-4).  There was also inadequate supervision when conducting 
the Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (‘inadequate supervision’, 
HFACS level-3).  There was a failure of communication between the 
Maintenance Operation Center and the Maintenance Planning Section in 
the airline (a ‘CRM’ issue, HFACS level-2) and a failure to provide 
adequate equipment for structural inspections (‘technology 
environment’, HFACS level-2).  This contributed directly to the line 
operator’s failure to detect structural defects in the rear pressure 
bulkhead (‘perceptual’ and ‘skill-based errors’, level-1).  The 
pressure bulkhead finally ruptured causing the aircraft to break up in 
flight (Aviation Safety Council, 2002; Li & Harris, 2005b). 
There are statistically significant associations between causal 
factors at the higher organizational levels, psychological 
contributory factors and errors in decision-making, skilled 
performance and the violations committed by pilots (see table 2 and 
figure 2).  It can even be suggested that poor organizational
processes at the highest levels in the organization result in poor 
supervisory oversight, which itself results in poor CRM resulting in 
wilful violations of the SOP.  However, some care needs to be taken 
when interpreting the statistical relationships presented within 
figure 2.  In a few categories the frequency counts are moderately 
small.  Furthermore, the frequency counts within categories were all 
derived from accidents.  It is unknown (and at the higher 
organizational levels perhaps it is unknowable) how often instances 
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within the various HFACS categories have occurred in day-to-day 
operations that have not resulted in an accident.  Thus, the 
relationships between HFACS levels and categories should not be 
interpreted outside the accident causal sequence.  However, some 
insight into the relative frequency of instances of error that have 
not resulted in an accident at HFACS levels 1 and 2 may perhaps be 
gained by the retrospective analysis of LOSA (Line Operations Safety 
Audit) data.  These are data gained through the observation (by 
trained observers) of crews on the flight deck engaged in everyday 
line operations, undertaken for the purpose of identifying the day-to-
day threats to commercial aviation safety (see Klinect, Wilhelm & 
Helmreich, 1999; Helmreich, Klinect & Wilhelm, 2001).  For example, in 
LOSA data collected by Thomas (2003) it was reported that in line 
operations, crews often did not demonstrate effective error detection.  
More than half of all errors observed remaining undetected by one or 
both of the flight crew.  Further, fine-grain analysis of this type of 
data may give some insight into the frequency with which undetected 
errors committed at the lower HFACS levels do not subsequently result 
in an accident.  Nevertheless, the results of this study of civil 
aviation accidents occurring in the ROC show a remarkable similarity 
to the study of military accidents conducted in the air force of the 
same country (Li & Harris 2006a; LI & Harris 2006b).
5 CONCLUSIONS
This study provides an understanding, based upon empirical evidence, 
of how actions and decisions at higher managerial levels in the 
operation of commercial aircraft in the ROC result in errors on the 
flight deck and subsequent accidents.  The results show clearly 
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defined, statistically-described paths that relate errors at level-1 
(the operational level) with inadequacies at both the immediately 
adjacent and also higher levels in the organization.  To reduce 
significantly the accident rate these ‘paths to failure’ relating to 
these organizational and human factors must be addressed.  This 
research draws a clear picture that supports Reason’s (1990) model of 
active failures resulting from latent conditions in the organization. 
Furthermore, the mechanisms relating to operational errors seem to be 
common to both civil and military operation in the ROC despite the 
different organizational imperatives and organizational structures 
underlying these types of operation (see Harris and Morley, 2006).  
Further work needs to be undertaken to establish if a similar pattern 
of results are found in other countries and cultures. 
The results suggest that interventions at HFACS levels 1 and 2 would 
only have limited effect in improving overall safety.  For example, 
CRM inadequacies are associated with subsequent error in three out of 
four categories at HFACS level-1.  However, improving CRM practices 
alone is unlikely to have a major impact on safety unless the 
supervisory processes (level-3) and organizational processes (level-4) 
are in place to provide things such as training facilities; the 
mechanisms to oversee CRM training and monitor its effectiveness, and 
respond to any further changes required in the training program.  All 
of these activities require organizational commitment and capacity, 
which can only be provided by the highest levels of management.  
Furthermore, on a ‘bang for the buck’ basis, interventions at higher 
levels are likely to be the most cost effective in the net safety 
benefits they realize.  Remedial safety actions should be aimed at the 
higher organizational areas that share the greatest numbers of 
associations with factors at lower organizational levels, in this case 
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‘organizational processes’ and ‘resource management’ at HFACS level-4.  
These are the categories at the root of the paths of association with 
many other HFACS categories.  This strongly suggests that the greatest 
gains in safety benefits could be achieved by targeting actions in 
these areas. 
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TABLE CAPTIONS
Table 1  Frequency counts (post-rater resolution) and inter-rater 
reliability statistics (prior to resolution) for each HFACS 
category for all 41 accidents.   Note that the percentages 
in the table will not equal 100%, because in many cases 
more than one causal factor was associated with the 
accident.  
Table 2 Significant chi-square test of association (p<0.001) and
associated values for Goodman and Kruskal’s Lambda for the 
analysis of upper level and adjacent downward level 
categories in the HFACS framework for the data derived from 
the analysis of the 41 accidents occurring to ROC 
commercial aircraft between 1999 and 2006.  All tests have 
1 degree of freedom.  All other comparisons were non-
significant.
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Organizational process 25 60.9 .510 75.6%
Organizational climate 9 21.9 .492 85.4%
Level-4,
Organizational 
Influences
Resource management 23 56.1 .262 63.4%
Supervisory violation 23 56.1 .360 68.3%
Failed correct a known 
problem
15 36.6 .358 73.2%
Planned inappropriate 
operations
18 43.9 .310 68.3%
Level-3,
Unsafe 
Supervision
Inadequate supervision 26 63.4 .369 70.7%
Technology environment 7 17.1 .000 70.7%
Physical environment 19 46.3 .610 80.5%
Personal readiness 8 19.5 .547 87.8%
Crew resource management 28 68.3 .459 73.2%
Physical/mental 
limitation
7 17.1 .109 80.5%
Adverse physiological 
states
1 2.4 .000 95.1%
Level-2,
Preconditions 
for Unsafe Acts
Adverse mental states 14 34.1 .229 68.3%
Violations 28 68.3 .584 80.5%
Perceptual errors 21 51.2 .517 75.6%
Skilled-based errors 29 70.7 .547 78.0%
Level-1,
Unsafe Acts of 
Operators
Decision errors 29 70.7 .597 82.9%
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Table 2
Chi-square
Significant association between upper level 
and adjacent downward level categories in 
the HFACS framework Value p L
a
m
b
d
a
Odds 
ratio
HFACS Level 4 association with Level 3 categories
Resource management * Planned inappropriate 
operations 14.009 .000 .500 2.500
Resource management * Inadequate supervision 10.777 .001 .333 10.857
Organizational process * Planned 
inappropriate operations 15.105 .000 .500 2.813
Organizational process * Inadequate 
supervision 22.563 .000 .667 9.000
Organizational process * Failed to correct a 
known problem
10.408 .001 .200 9.500
Organizational process * Supervisory 
violation
20.251 .000 .667 3.000
HFACS Level 3 association with Level 2 categories
Inadequate supervision * CRM 9.744 .001 .231 8.250
Planned inappropriate operations * Physical 
environment
8.946 .001 .421 7.367
Supervisory violation * Personal readiness 10.752 .001 .000 0.000
HFACS Level 2 association with Level 1 categories
Adverse mental states * Decision error 12.476 .001 .000 0.000
Adverse mental states * Skill based error 12.476 .001 .000 0.000
Adverse mental states * Perceptual error 10.124 .001 .045 12.000
CRM * Decision errors 20.882 .000 .583 43.333
CRM * Skill-based errors 20.882 .000 .583 43.333
CRM * Violations 17.973 .000 .583 27.778
Physical environment * Perceptual errors 10.896 .001 .500 10.000
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FIGURE LEGENDS
Figure 1 The HFACS framework.  Each upper level is proposed to 
affect items at the lower levels (Wiegmann and Shappell, 
2003).
Figure 2 Paths between categories at the four levels in the HFACS 
framework showing the significant associations (p<0.001) 
using chi-square (2) and lambda (λ)
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